

杨奎松：新中国“镇压反革命”运动研究

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FN 094 – Yang Kuisong on Research of Zhenfan Campaign



[摘要]在中华人民共和国建国之初，战争尚未完全结束，土地改革正在渐次开展起来，经济恢复工作一切百废待兴，尽管各地反抗事件频发，毛泽东却反对“四面出击”，没有响应党内实施大规模镇压的要求。不过数月之后，因朝鲜战败，中国被迫出兵抗美援朝之际，毛泽东又抓住对外战争的机会，毫不犹豫地大举发动了“镇压反革命”运动，力图乘举国对外之际，一举清除社会上的反革命分子。这场以巩固城市政权为中心任务的镇压反革命运动，轰轰烈烈，极大地震慑了社会各种敌对势力，提高了新政权的威望。

[关键词]毛泽东：新中国：镇反运动：反革命分子

1950年代初，由于新政权受到旧势力的严重挑战，新中国曾发动了大规模的“镇压反革命”运动。一时间全国大小城镇群情激昂，形成了强大的镇压声势。仅仅用了不过年左右的时间，各地对新政权构成威胁的各种旧势力，包括恶霸、地主、惯匪、特务、国民党党团及军警政骨干分子，以及曾经杀害中共人员或给中共造成严重损害的分子，大部遭到

了严厉的惩罚，从而也极大地树立起共产党的权威，牢牢地稳固了新生政权的政治地位，特别是全面改善了许多地区原本十分动荡和混乱的社会秩序。因此，此一运动虽然“杀”、“关”、“管”的规模在中华人民共和国的历史上空前绝后，却在相当程度上得到了多数民众的认可和赞同。

对于这样一场声势浩大，影响深远的镇反运动，至今尚未见多少深入的学术研究。^①其中原因，一方面与相关档案的开放程度低有一定的关联，另一方面，也许是更主要的，则是因为在建国后历次政治运动当中，镇反运动的作用向来在大陆学者的心目中争议不多。因为，以后的反右运动、反右倾运动、四清运动，乃至文化大革命运动等等，档案开放程度同样很低，却明显地受到关注，并有了相当的研究成果。不过，无论其情理如何，曲直与否，作为建国以来历次政治运动之首的这场运动，总应有实事求是的学术性研究，使人能了解其来龙去脉，探究其因果与影响，是为当然。

镇反运动发生之时，正值全国性土改运动斗争高涨之际。镇反运动虽以城市为主，但各地县乡亦在其列，许多地方亦波及村镇。且镇反运动的相当一部分对象为逃亡地主及城乡恶霸，故其与农村中土改打杀地主恶霸以及当时的“清匪反霸”斗争亦往往纠缠一团，不易截然分清。再加上以中国之大，地区差异之甚，运动的复杂性及其地方动作的差异性亦不可限量，故笔者并不指望在一篇文章里概括出这场运动的全貌。本文只是着重从建国初期毛泽东和中共中央具体决策形成和变化的过程，及其与地方间互动的情况，来尝试着描述与分析这场运动形成发展的复杂情形与其内在的一些问题。

一

从1948年秋天开始，中共军队从东北地区开始，横扫华北、华东、华中、华南、西南和西北，仅两年左右时，就占据了中国大陆绝大部分地区，在全国范围内，从上到下建立起了一整套党政权力控制体制。但是，军事的胜利并不足以保证新生政权的巩固与长治久安。还在中共准备全面取代国民党而成为执政党之初，毛泽东就再三告诫全党，切忌重蹈李自成进城的覆辙。在1948年9月的政治局会议上，毛泽东特别提出了进城后务必重视阶级分析和加强阶级斗争观念的问题。他甚至宣称：进城以后，必须时刻牢记阶级立场，时刻不忘阶级斗争。一切文件、文章，凡讲到阶级问题的，都是深刻的：凡没有讲到或讲不清楚这个问题的，都叫做肤浅。[1](p1351, 1432~1435)

实际上，无论城市还是乡村，也无论是新区还是老区^①，自从中共开始大规模夺得政权以来，就不断地遇到局部的，但却是相当激烈的反抗。

1949年8月华北局的报告反映了老区此类案件之严重。报告称：“一、纵火。天津、安新均发生弹药库爆炸，林县焚毁仓库两处，北平电车被焚五十余辆，石景山钢铁化验室亦曾失火，冀南、太行我党员村干与干属麦子被烧者数十起，冀南十三个县统计，烧毁麦子一九一七亩。二、杀人。冀鲁豫二十六个县三个月内统计共杀人五十五起，死人八十八名，大部为匪特反革命分子所杀。冀南近三月内反动地富杀害我村干党员四起，绥远陶林二区踢步忽洞村地主勾结土匪一次即杀我村干部积极分子十二人。自元月至今合计约有二八八人(被杀)，这些人命案件大部与国民党特务和反革命分子有关。”[2](p394)

1950年3月西南局的报告则反映了新区此类案件之严重。报告称：“近一个时期以来，西南川、康、云、贵各省，连续有土匪在各地发动大规模武装暴乱。”“继二月五日在成都西南龙潭寺地区近万土匪暴乱，杀害我一七九师政治部主任朱向璃及前闻讯前往增援部队五十多名干部战士，随后被我派部队前往歼灭后，二月份以来，各地土匪又围攻并占领了包括温江、崇庆、郫县、金堂、新繁及川东之秀山等多座县城。邛崃城遭匪万人之围攻。壁山军分区一夜之间八个区政权遭匪袭击而全部丢失。平塘全县我地方工作人员被匪杀害达八十余人。该县忠孝乡一保一次被匪劫去妇女十六岁至二十岁妇女四十名。次日，河扬乡往平塘赶场之妇女二十一人被匪剥光衣服，七人被强奸，两名军属被强奸后又掳走。清镇县属鸡场，三天之内遭匪两次洗劫，第一次被抢居民十三户，第二次全村九十余户全部被抢，并被土匪杀死七十余人，八名商人被扔到火中活活烧死。另匪首曾绍华近数万人接连三次袭击贵州大学 and 花溪市，打死学生、员工多人，先后掳走男女学生九十余名：长顺县匪首支超初用刀活活砍死我副县长、县政府部长、科长等四人。成渝、成灌、渝黔几条重要公路，渝泸等水路全部被土匪掐断：蓉雅、川湘两路之桥梁全被破坏。土匪甚至组织儿童拦截我军用汽车，抢走物资，杀害我押车干部战士。此类惨案，近日来连连发生，无法一一列举。这同时，个别国民党起义部队在一些匪特的策划下，也连连发生叛变。如原国民党李振兵团及二十七军之六十一师、二十军之一二三师等。目前，据初步估计，仅川西地区，各种公开活动之土匪就达一〇四股之多，小股数十、数百余人，大股万余人一起活动，总计不下六万余匪。并且，还有继续以极其迅猛的速度蔓延发展之势。”[3](p183~184)

由于注意到中华人民共和国正式宣告成立后，敌特土匪的破坏活动有日渐严重的趋势，因毛泽东访苏归来暂时休养而主持中共中央工作的刘少奇这时接连发出指示，要求各地严厉打击反革命破坏分子。在他的主持下，1950年3月，中共中央先后发出了《关于剿灭土匪建立革命新秩序的指示》和《关于镇压反革命活动的指示》。[4](p159)公安部并据此在许多城市开展了敌特党团分子的登记工作，通过警告、检举等上下结合的方式，逼使原国民党特务机关人员及其国民党和三青团骨干分子主动交代身份，以便摸底排队，掌握城市中敌对分子的状况。据3月间中共北京市委报告，从入城以来到报告之时，北京市已逮捕、集训和登记的敌特党团分子已达6900余名，其中登记者即占一半以上。另据浙江省的统计，其仅登记的反动党团分子就超过11万人。又据山东省的统计，其登记的土匪、恶霸地主、反动道会门头子、特务及反动党团骨干等五种反革命分子，就达到137599名。②

与此同时，刘少奇还接连发出指示，要求各地严厉镇压反革命。3月28日，刘在华东军区和第三野战军政治部23日关于皖南军区破获匪特案件通报上明确批示：“近来各地对于反革命分子的镇压有些不够，这样就会鼓励反革命分子的活动，对于经过宽待争取而仍进行反革命活动的分子，必须处以长期徒刑以至死刑，此点望公安部及司法机关即向各地发一指示，请董(必武——引者注)老与罗瑞卿同志拟一指示发出。”[5](p613)29日，他又在铁道部长滕代远前一日关于匪特破坏铁路情况给军委并中财委的报告上批道：“对这些破坏分子必须严办，不严办，不给以恐怖是不对的。公安部及铁道部即商讨出办法通知各地，批评各地麻痹现象。”[6](p613)

30日，了解到中苏合办股份公司协定见报后，一些地方学生上街抗议，刘少奇也马上联系到反革命分子的问题。他指出：“在绝大多数群众中这种怀疑是出于幼稚的民族主义的情绪，但反革命分子必然借此大肆活动，并在活动中暴露自己的反革命面貌。各地党委团委及公安部门对此必须密切地加以注意。”“要特别注意那些激烈的作各种反革命提议和行动的分子，记取他们的言论和行动，并对他们加以侦察，以便发现他们之中的反革命行为和反革命组织，然后在适当时期由公安部门加以破获。”“对确实有据的反革命分子，在有了充分的侦察和准备之后，必须加以严厉的彻底的镇压。”[7](p615~616)

在刘少奇和中共中央的再三提示下，各相关部门领导人亦发出了严厉镇压反革命的呼声和要求。在这里尤其值得提到的，是对此后镇反运动的形成颇有影响的彭真的报告。彭真在报告中说：依据中央指示精神，政法委员会派出两个工作组前往察哈尔省的宣化及河北省的唐山两个专区进行了司法调查，发现“在正确地纠正了‘乱打乱杀’的偏向之后，现在不少地方宽大政策又偏差到‘宽大无边’，宽大到‘灭自己志气，长匪特威风’，宽大到助长匪特气焰，脱离人民大众的程度了。”对此，报告举例称：“有些地方对罪大恶极，甚至曾杀我干部百余人，曾杀我县长及干部多人的反动头子，曾杀死群众多人的匪徒，却不判死刑：或下级法院判了死刑，而上级法院又改为徒刑。”而更多地方则因法院不健全，积压案件甚多：对于已有处刑决定之匪特案件，亦往往拖延甚久，以致失去时效。这种情况已导致匪特分子气焰张扬，“新区、半老区群众很怕土匪特务，对匪特和我治安人员竟采两面应付办法。甚至有些村干部，也因为怕遭匪特和“遭殃”，对于所知匪特匿而不报。群众对于政府的清匪除奸的号召，则认为是空话，报之以极冷淡的态度。”①

彭真的报告尖锐地提出了各级政府机关，特别是各级法院“宽大无边”，导致匪特分子气焰嚣张的情况，不仅推动了政务院和最高人民法院于7月23日联合颁布了《关于镇压反革命活动的指示》，[8](p358~360)而且成为此后大规模镇反运动开展的一个重要的根据。

但是，对于上述种种情况，包括刘少奇和相关部门大力镇压的指示及部署，毛泽东却在很长一段时期内没有做出相应的指示。如前所述，毛泽东在进城之前就已经再三强调阶级斗争问题，且其始终是暴力革命和阶级专政的最坚决的主张者，包括在中共中央进城前夕，他还在强调：共产党的政权，“对一切反革命分子是独裁、专政、专制”，故必须“肃清全国的反革命分子”。进城后，他更是公开声明：对反动派只有暴力和专制，绝不施仁政，“或者把老虎打死，或者被老虎吃掉，二者必居其一。”②因此，毛泽东不可能不重视镇压反革命的问题。

毛泽东为什么对这个时期开展镇反运动不甚积极？这是因为，他从一开始就已经注意到，由于新中国必须要建立具有统一战线性质的联合政府，就使得对付反革命的问题变得复杂得多了。他在1949年初对俄国人解释他的想法时就明确讲过这个问题，说：如果建立一党政府，这样做就容易得多：如果建立联合政府，那就“必将带来麻烦”，因为共产党必须要顾及其他政党的态度，而不能简单地依据自己的意愿来行事。[9](p22)也正因为要建立联合政府，毛泽东甚至对占领大城市的问题都格外谨慎③，对新政府成立后帝国主义会“组织所谓反对派从内部来破坏革命”的危险更是格外担心④。他已经再三告诫党内：“在拿枪的敌人被消灭以后，不拿枪的敌人依然存在，他们必然地要和我们作拼死的斗争，我们决不可轻视这些敌人”。[10](p1428)毛泽东特别强调共产党人要避免重蹈李自成当年的覆

辙，强调进城后要警惕不要被资产阶级的糖衣炮弹所打中，亦都是为此。但也正是因为注意到进城后会面临如此复杂的局面，故建国伊始，毛泽东就对任何可能造成重大影响的行为都小心翼翼，避免四面出击。

比如，1950年3月毛泽东从莫斯科回国后，就马上针对当时正在广泛开展的土改运动提出：中国的土改应当学习苏联的经验，暂时不动富农的土地。其理由有三：“第一是土改规模空前伟大，容易发生过左偏向，只动地主不动富农，则更能孤立地主，保护中农，并防止乱打乱杀，否则很难防止”：“第二是过去北方土改，是在战争中进行的，战争完全掩盖了土改空气，现在基本上已无战争，土改就显得特别突出，给予社会的震动为得重大，地主叫唤的声音将特别显得尖锐。如果我们暂时不动半封建富农，待到几年之后再动：动他们，则将显得我们更加有理由，即是说更加有政治上的主动权：第三是我们和民族资产阶级的统一战线现在已经在政治上、经济上和组织上都形成了，而民族资产阶级是与土地问题密切联系的，为了稳定民族资产阶级起见，暂时不动半封建富农似较妥当。”^①毛泽东这里的中心思想很明白，就是突出强调统战政策的需要，要求全党注意运用策略，对敌人要分而击之，以免太过刺激统战对象使其不满。

对农村中的富农尚且担心发生“左”的偏差，诉诸激烈手段，大规模镇压社会上的反革命分子，影响面更大，毛泽东自然表现得更加谨慎了。1950年6月，中共中央召开七届三中全会，毛泽东在会上做了报告，在书面报告中他鲜明地肯定了镇压反革命的极端必要性，指出：凡是反革命，“都有帝国主义特别是美帝国主义在背后策动”，“都是帝国主义的走狗”，对一切土匪、特务、恶霸及其他反革命分子，都必须坚决肃清。但是，他同时在口头解释这个报告的思想时，却明确告诉与会者，报告虽然面面俱到，讲了各方面的工作要求，然而，当前一切工作的重心，还是在“为国家财政经济状况的基本好转而斗争”。为什么不能把肃清反革命的工作当作重中之重？他做了详尽的解释。他说：第一，“我们已经在北方约有一亿六千万人口的地区完成了土地改革……今年秋季，我们就要在约有三亿一千万人口这样广大的地区开始土地改革，推翻整个地主阶级。在土地改革中，我们的敌人是够大够多的。”

第二，革命胜利引起了社会经济改组。再加上战争已经带来了许多破坏，许多人对我们不满。尤其是“现在我们跟民族资产阶级的关系搞得很紧张，他们惶惶不可终日，很不满”，而因为战争破坏和经济改组所造成的失业的分子和失业的工人也不满意我们，还有一批小手工业者，包括一部分农民也不满意我们。因此，我们目前的首要任务，在城里是“要合理地调整工商业，使工厂开工，解决失业问题，并且拿出二十亿斤粮食解决失业工人的吃饭问题，使失业工人拥护我们。”同时“通过合理调整工商业，调整税收，”改善同民族资产阶级的关系。通过举办各种大学和使用知识分子，使他们不反对我们。而在农村，则是要通过减租减息、剿匪反霸、土地改革，使广大农民拥护我们。总之，“就是要使人民中间不满意我们的人变成拥护我们”，至少不要使他们反对我们。换言之，毛泽东的想法很简单，就是：“不要四面出击”，“不可树敌太多”。用他的话来说，“四面出击，全国紧张，很不好”。不是不要搞镇压反革命运动，而是要分清轻重缓急，“我们无论如何不能急躁，急了会出毛病”。“必须在一个方面有所让步，有所缓和，集中力量向另一方面进

攻。”[11](p397~400)这其实也正是毛泽东在军事所擅长的“各个击破”的策略在政治上的一种运用。

二

高度注重策略的灵活性，是毛泽东政治运作的一个重要特点。但由此也足以说明，毛泽东绝不是那种墨守成规的人。战争的目的在于战胜敌人，一切策略的应用，都是为着这一目的服务的。因此，当战争形势发生变化时，迅速调整既定策略，以追求更好的效果，就成为一种必然。毛泽东在镇压反革命问题上的策略变化，也正是如此。

1950年6月毛泽东还极力劝告党内同志不要急躁，切忌四面出击。然而，几个月后，随着朝鲜战争爆发，北朝鲜人民军很快失利，中国方面不得不准备出兵，他马上就改变了此前对镇压反革命问题不甚积极的态度。他意识到，这是一个彻底清除国内反革命分子的“千载一时之机”。因此，中共中央10月8日正式决定出兵朝鲜，他两天后就亲自主持通过了新的《关于镇压反革命活动的指示》(又称“双十”指示)，在全国范围内部署大规模镇压反革命的工作。

毛泽东在决定出兵朝鲜的同时下决心镇反，自然有其攘外安内的现实需要。除前述各种敌视共产党的旧势力相当活跃以外，仅国民党特务的活动，就对中共后方的安全与军事行动的秘密，构成了巨大的威胁。据报，在不到一年的时间里，北京至9月底就已破获特务案件177件，天津12个月破获73件，平原省9个月破获22件，绥远省6个月破获60件，河南省8个月破获183件。据《人民日报》公开报道称：“从去年十月至今年九月先后被我公安部门捕获的特务分子达一万三千余人，并破获美帝国主义在中国所直接进行的间谍案件数起，缴获的特务机关的电台共一百七十五部。”^②

而朝鲜战争的爆发，特别是美国及其联合国军的大举卷入，原本就在社会上造成了一定的恐慌心理。特务分子以及各种不满中共政权的旧势力散布的各种谣言，更是在许多偏远地区和农村，造成了民众的惊恐不安。甚至，一些地方还发生了已经被剥夺的地主和旧富农进行反攻倒算的事件。最严重的地方，一个省里平均一个县就发生了七八起。

在这种情况下，旧社会遗留下来的一贯道等会道门组织的影响和作用，就自然而然地突显了出来。其不仅人数众多，而且许多地方的基层党政人员也都深陷其中，受其左右，从而不能不引起地方党政的严重不安。据中共华北局报称：“在会道门活动方面，河北发现有四百零一种，道徒无全省统计，仅石门六县即有各种道徒约六万四千人：山西一百五十种，仅一贯道即达八十一万多人：平原八十二种，道徒约三十万人：察哈尔五十余种，道徒约二十万：绥远二十余种，：北京三十八种，仅一贯道即有道徒二十万人：天津十余种，一贯道、青帮、世界佛教会各约十万人上下。就全区说，以一贯道分布最广，也最反动，全区共约道徒一百五十万人，仅山西忻县地区即有一贯道徒约十九万，占该区人口的百分之十四点六，连其他会道门计算，则占人口的百分之十七点七。崞县每村皆有一贯道，代县百分之七十四的农村支部，均有党员参加，在全县不到三千名党员中，有百分之十八参加了一贯道。察省雁北地委调查了九百个党员，即有五百个参加一贯道，其中一百个党员宁退党不退道。该道上层多为地主富农及国民党反动的旧军人，一般道徒则多为中贫农。这

些会道门中的大多数，特别是一贯道和龙华会，已为特务组织所掌握和利用，成为反革命活动的有力工具。”[12](p557~560)

由于各地农村都存在着这样一种社会基础，结果自然也就便利了国民党地下潜伏及派遣人员的反抗活动。另据华北局报告称：“匪特的反革命活动已不仅限于隐蔽的造谣、暗害、破线、破路等卑鄙行为，且已走上公开的直接的武装暴动的阶段”。它们或“积极扩大力量，组织反动武装”，或“联络旧党特人员，操纵土匪，进行所谓‘敌后游击’”。①在“双十”指示发出前后，仅华北地区就发生各种暴动十余起。规模较大的就有：河北武安县“黄兵道”武装暴动事件、山西稷山县国民党流散官兵袭占五区公所及县府事件、河北省通县“全佛大道会”暴动事件等。作为镇压反革命运动的中心指挥机构，中央公安部这时明确认为，各地反动组织活跃异常的根本原因在于，反革命为数过多，而镇压不力。它在综合了全国的情况之后，这时专门向中共中央提交过一个报告。说明：其一，全国范围内“从一九四九年一月到今年八月，约计捕获特务二万五千零四十一名，处死者仅六百三十九名。检查去年十月至今年九月所破获的一百三十五起要案中，有处理报告者仅十余起。南京解放以来至今年九月只杀过四个人，青岛解放以来至今年七月只杀过两个反革命分子，福建匪患严重的建瓯县解放以来至今年八月未杀过一人，已足说明镇压不够的严重情况。”

其二，重罪轻判、迟判，镇压不及时。如石家庄对“十九号”特务机关作恶多端的匪特首要王钧，拖延至三年之久，最近始判死刑。西安土匪拒捕打死我邮差，西安法院认为系“自卫”，不判死罪。南京土匪拒捕枪杀我公安员，竟按“初犯”理由改死刑为徒刑。张轸部被我破获的反命叛变案犯，有人认为是“未遂犯”。反革命俘虏搞叛变，说是我们教育不够，以及不管罪恶大小，强调既往不咎等。而判决批准，手续繁多，华东说最快两三个月，慢的两年三年。法院不健全，旧司法人员中有浓厚的旧法律观点。

其三，由于镇压不够和不及时的结果，形成此地释放，彼处作案，今日释放，明日作案，在押人犯更是大批积压，以致接连发生犯人越狱、暴动事件。[13](第93期，1950年11月15日，p16~17)“双十”指示无疑是以上述形势判断为依据的。指示明确提出：“在镇压反革命问题上，发生了严重的右的偏向，以致有大批的首要的、怙恶不悛的、在解放后甚至在经过宽大处理后仍然继续为恶的反革命分子，没有受到应有的制裁。”[14](p235~236)但可以肯定的是，“双十”镇反，关键并不在于敌情突然严重，甚至也不是因为攘外必先安内的考虑。对于毛泽东来说，镇压反革命是共产党建政后早就决定必须要采取的重大步骤之一，唯一的考虑是适当的时机。面对即将到来的抗美援朝的强大声势，毛泽东当机立断要求大张旗鼓地清除反革命分子，就是因为他认为这样的时机来到了。

对此，毛泽东这时对公安部长罗瑞卿有过清楚的解释。他说，在此之前为什么不能大量地镇压反革命？是因为时机不成熟，我们的财经问题还没有解决，同资产阶级的关系还比较紧张。如果我们在那个时候提出大量镇压反革命，是不合适的。现在情况不同了，财经问题基本解决了，抗美援朝战争也打起来了，因此，“你们不要浪费了这个时机，镇压反革命恐怕只有这一次，以后就不会有了。千载难逢，你们要好好运用这个资本，不尽是为了杀几个反革命，而更主要的是为了发动群众。”②

刘少奇随后的解释更为形象。他说:镇压反革命的运动为什么能够大张旗鼓地搞起来,关键在于有了抗美援朝战争。“抗美援朝很有好处,使我们的很多事情都好办(如搞土改,订爱国公约,搞生产竞赛、镇反等)。因为抗美援朝的锣鼓响起来,响得很厉害,土改的锣鼓、镇反的锣鼓就不大听见了,就好搞了。如果没有抗美援朝的锣鼓响得那么厉害,那么土改(和镇反)的锣鼓就不得了了。这里打死一个地主,那里也打了一个,到处闹”,“很多事情不好办”。③

很显然,基于过去革命的经验,毛泽东相当了解,这种大规模镇压行动,不仅对反共的旧势力会有强大的震慑力,而且会对广大基层民众起到一种相当形象化的政治教育的作用,会极大地树立起新政权的政治权威。对于刚刚取得全国政权的共产党人来说,这一点特别重要。

因此,“双十”指示即特别按照毛泽东的意见,明确提出:这次镇压反革命,要特别注意对群众的教育作用。其作法就是:“当杀者,应即判处死刑。当监禁和改造者,应即逮捕监禁,加以改造。对于这些案件的执行,必须公布判决,在报纸上发布消息(登在显著地位),并采取其他方法,在群众中进行广泛的宣传教育。”[14]“双十”指示虽然批判了“宽无边”的“右的偏向”,强调“严厉制裁”,但并未提出严惩的标准。指示要求各地“依照中央人民政府政务院公布的惩治反革命条例加以镇压”,而这时政务院却尚未有条例颁布。再加上指示仍旧突出强调了要防止发生“左”的偏向,继续要求“重证据而不轻信口供”,规定“判处死刑时,党内必须经过省委、大市委、区党委及受委托的地委批准”,而各地本来工作就头绪繁多,且又有过以往中央几度指示“镇反”不了了之的经验,故多数地方开始显然未给予高度重视。①

按照“双十”指示规定的时间,各地均应在11月10日以前向中央提交报告并拿出“镇反”的计划来。但迟至11月中下旬,才陆续有西南局、华北局和北京市等少数地方将“镇反”报告及计划送至中央。从毛泽东对这些报告的批示情况看,他此时对“镇反”的作法亦尚无具体成熟的设想,因而特别看重地方的设想与实践。因此,对一些明显过于笼统的提法,如西南局提出的“罪大恶极者”坚决处死,“罪恶甚大者”分别判处徒刑或关押,“罪恶较轻者”可在释放后加以妥善管制,同时“对于一切反革命的处理必须具体分析,讲究策略,区别对待,达到镇压反革命、瓦解分化敌人的目的”的方案,毛泽东也明确表示赞同。而对北京市委提出的“先搞特务,再搞反动党团,最后搞各种反动的封建势力”,和力求准、稳、狠的并无确切标准的打击办法,也是全盘肯定,并向各地大力推广。②

一些地方开始动作后,即按照“双十”指示的要求,公开判决,发布消息,声势搞得较大。但这却又引起了中共中央在某种程度上的担心。这是因为,在中共历史上,屡次发生肃反运动扩大化的情况,再加上1947年华北土改和1949年进城后一些地方发生过乱捕乱杀的现象而不得不加以纠正。因此,运动刚刚发动不过一个多月,刘少奇就开始紧急部署适度降温,又强调要注意策略。刘少奇在高干会上即明确提出:“镇压反革命要有计划有秩序地进行,宣传报告工作亦应如此。即是要有计划、有重点的去进行宣传工作。对重要案件,在群众中影响大,对特务活动打击大者,必须发布重要新闻,并配合以通讯、短评、社论等进行系统的报道,藉以鼓舞群众防奸反特斗争情绪,并以分化匪众,收杀一儆百之效。但对一般案件,对群众影响教育不大者,则不必亦不应件件报道。因以后镇压较多,如果

每杀一人都要报道，在报纸上过多的宣传杀人，亦恐产生副作用，如可能使某些人怀疑我们“杀人过多”、“行动过火”等。”[15](第 95 期，1950 年 12 月 6 日，p1~2)

不仅如此，刘少奇等人显然认为，大张旗鼓地镇压反革命，仍然需要有个限度，特别要注意掌握分寸。不仅宣传上要注意策略，就是杀人也要注意策略。川东区党委这时有指示称：“自新匪特中的组长以上的职业特务应速送行署公安厅管训，其中少数负有血债者应处以死刑”，刘少奇明确批示：“将最末处以死刑一句删去”，“匪特分子，包括首要分子在内，既已向我自新投诚，不再进行反革命活动，即使过去负有血债，亦不应杀。”[16](p553)华东局这时有报告称，他们自 6 月份起即已纠正过分宽大的偏向，1~10 月已破获特务案件 2195 件(缺福建省)，逮捕特务 14080 人，破获电台 103 部，连同其他反革命盗匪等共处死刑 2911 人，徒刑 13093 人，登记反动党团 101636 人，掌握线索者 154592 人。中共中央对此即明确批复道：“在镇压反革命分子中，如果一个地方已经杀得不少时，则可适时略为放松一点，即大批处决人犯的时间延长一些，缓和一下社会各界紧张的空气，此时报纸上亦不要登得太多，即只把处决要犯登报，次要者便不必登报。”③

这个时候，运动不过刚刚开始，除北京、天津和少部分基层外，多数地区尚未真正行动起来，动员、宣传和教育群众的声势都尚未造成，毛泽东未必希望马上就来束缚各级干部的手脚。最典型的例子，就是刘少奇批示对自新分子不应处以死刑时，毛泽东特别将其修改为：“如果血债重大群众要求处以死刑，并估计情况在处死之后比较不处死更为有利时，亦可处以死刑。”[17](p553~554)但建国伊始，又是同时在抗美援朝和土地改革两大运动的同时，在全国几亿人口中开展如此大规模的政治运动，毛泽东一时也还不能不慎重其事。

当西南局宣传部根据中央高干会的指示，就《新华日报》“很不策略”地“连篇累牍”刊载清匪反霸的消息做出检讨后，毛泽东即专门批转各地吸取教训，同意不要造成“一种非常紧张的气氛”。④当中南局提出：“镇反”“必须强调打得准、打得稳，要做到有准备、有重点、有区别、有分寸”，“镇压反革命的战线与抗美援朝土地改革两条重要战线必须密切配合，要使这几个方面的打拉策略步骤配合得宜，取得相互支援之效，而不可无策略地多面出击，引起全局紧张，孤立自己”。毛泽东也高度肯定，并指示说：“这是关于镇压反革命的全套策略问题，如果不在干部中弄清楚，并加以严密掌握，就有为反革命所利用，为民主人士所不满，为人民所不同意，使我党陷入被动的可能。”[18](p751~752)

当黄克诚提出，对解放后并无罪恶的湖南起义军官“不宜采取急躁处理办法，除其中个别特别反动的分子应逮捕惩治外，不宜逮捕过多”，否则将引起极大惊恐时，毛泽东亦明确批示“即照黄电意见处理为宜”。[19](p5~6)受此影响，一些省份，如河南省，将近一年执行死刑 3000 人，就敏感地发现各地捕杀已开始出现草率现象，注意到民主人士、工商界、知识分子及学生中均“有些震动”，因而刚刚进入到 1951 年 1 月，就迅速决定一般停止逮捕和杀人了。对于河南等地的这种谨慎的作法，毛泽东这时也照样转电各地，表示肯定。[20](p46)

当然，各中央局领导人是不会对毛泽东的这一建议表示异议的。故毛泽东 5 月初从外地刚一回京，就马上找来罗瑞卿，命令罗立即召开全国公安会议，部署全面收缩。同时，他亦电告中南、西南等区的负责人，要求他们“严重注意”“镇反”捕人杀人失控的情况。③他电

告华南分局说：“根据华南已杀五万七千多，现押犯人尚有十六万多的情况，华南两省一市应和豫、鄂、湘、赣一样，从六月一日起停止捕人四个月，集中力量清理积案，总结经验，教育干部。”④

毛泽东此时态度之急，罗瑞卿在随后召开的中央宣传工作会议上有过介绍。他说：“原来我们是准备在六七月才开这个会，那天主席说不行，要马上开，把时间都规定好了，要在五月十号开。我说，现在城市里面镇压反革命的工作各方面都比较紧急，恐怕马上开会不好。他说：正因为紧急，才要马上开。”[55]

根据毛泽东建议召开的第三次全国公安会议的决议，基本上是毛亲自监督修改制定的。会议承认：运动“后期有若干地方发生了简单粗糙现象，可杀可不杀的杀了一些，可捕可不捕的捕了一些”，至于根本搞错的还尚未检查。在这种情况下，镇压反革命的运动，必须及时地“从大胆放手的方针，改变为适当地加以收缩的方针”。[55]

毛泽东又开始讲：在镇压反革命的问题上，右倾比左倾好。右了你说纠正明天就可以起来，容易纠正；左了以后就不好办。总之，“杀人不能太多，杀得太多了，丧失社会同情，丧失了劳动力”。据此，《第三次全国公安会议决议》明确提出：“关于杀反革命的数字，必须控制在一定的比例以内。将捕人批准的权限由县一律收回到地委、专署一级，将杀人批准权由地、专一律收回到省、自治区一级。”“凡是介在可捕可不捕之间的人一定不要捕，如果捕了就是犯错误；凡是介在可杀可不杀之间的人一定不要杀，如果杀了就是犯错误。”[54]

中共中央还特别针对高级民主人士及其家属的问题，发布了专门的指示。指示承认：“现在有些非党的中央人民政府委员、政务院委员和其他方面的高级民主人士，因为他们的家属和戚友，在土改和镇反中被杀、被捕、被‘扫地出门’或被没收了城市中的若干财产，已引起极大的不安和不满，对于统一战线已发生了极坏的影响。”因而要求：“对于解放前，已开始参加反蒋斗争，已与我们合作的民主人士特别是高级民主人士，对于真正起义的军官，在土改和镇反中，必须有意地予以特殊的照顾或宽大处理……决不可不加区别地把他们与一般反动地主和反动军官一样对待。”不仅不得“扫地出门”和没收其城市中的财产，而且“纵有若干劣迹，应尽可能劝其向群众低头认错，求得了结，而不加逮捕。其应加速捕处刑者，亦应从宽处理”。必须逮捕和处死时，亦须先报中央局和中央批准及备案。[56](p432~433)

事实上，还在全国公安会议正式召开之前，中共中央就已经根据毛泽东的建议，就收回捕杀权和处理党、政、军、群众团体内反革命分子问题发出了指示，特别提出了一个避免多杀人的死刑缓期执行的量刑方法。其指示的中心旨意，就是第一次明白规定了杀人的标准，即：“只杀有血债的：有引起群众愤恨的其他重大罪行，例如强奸许多妇女、掠夺许多财产者，以及最严重损害国家利益者”。“其余一律采取判处死刑、缓期二年执行、在缓刑期内强制劳动、以观后效的政策。”中共中央强调：这个方法既可以避免犯错误，又可以获得广大社会人士的同情，还可以分化反革命势力，同时还能够保存大批的劳动力，一举数得，因此，应尽量推广实行。包括农村中的反革命，除了人民要求杀的人必须杀掉者外，有些人亦应采取判死缓的政策。[57](p246~247)

各中央局及其下属各省市分区党委对执行中共中央的指示，通常都相当迅速。如西南区下属的川西区自接到“双十”指示后，1950年11月处决了反革命分子1188人，12月处决了942人，1951年1月处决1309人，2月处决了3030人，3月处决了1076人，4月处决了844人，而自得到毛泽东要求控制杀人的指示之后，从4月下旬至6月上旬，总共只杀了403人。川西党委5月4日明确批示：“从五月份起，一切无血债、放火、放毒、暗杀及非杀不能平抑群众愤怒者，一律不许批杀，已批杀之各项犯人中，均将原批数中细加审查，有无上述情况并有多少，望即查告。”[24](建西 1/114/3~40)

当然，仅仅要求各地谨慎处决人犯，暂停捕人和提出死刑缓期执行的办法，除对少数地方外，并不足以根本解决捕杀数字过大的问题。这少数地方，主要分两种情况，一是像山东省，因为过去是老区，土改中已经大杀了几批，此次再杀，被杀人犯又接近了总人口数的千分之零点五，故省委早就认为“这个数目已经到了不能再高的限度”了。[54]其领导层态度明确，禁止捕人的决心亦大。一是像上海市，因属工商业中心，经济生产任务很重，再加上民族资产阶级聚集，上海市委始终对大捕大杀心存疑虑，故在政策掌握上其军管会较注意分寸。根据所捕人犯的情况，他们明显地主张收缩杀人数字。因而也早就提出“杀两千后再视情况决定”[58]的要求，此时自然也容易控制。然而，其他地区掌握起来却复杂得多。

据中共中央5月底开始对外宣布的数字，这个时候“全国捕人一百五十万，其中已杀五十万”。①而事实上，各地所捕的人犯中，即使依据新标准，也还有大批要处决。饶漱石就明确告诉中共中央说：华东在押的26万人犯中，年内至少还要杀掉30000多人。[58]而南京市委在毛泽东前一阶段全力督促下已经制定了多杀的计划，“已杀和预定今年内要杀的人数，将超过一般城市杀人千分之点五的标准，而达人口千分之一之数。”②且饶漱石亦明确告诉中央称：“华东各地大城市镇反工作开展不久，群众痛恨有血债或有其他重大罪行的城市恶霸、大流氓、匪首、惯匪尚多未捕未杀……有的还敢用放火、杀人、破坏等手段威胁群众(如吴蕴初工厂于大逮捕后被反革命放火烧掉，我本人在大逮捕后即连续接到几次附上子弹的威胁信件等)。”所以华东各大中城市停止逮捕的时间还应展期。③

另外一方面，各地随后也提出了所谓运动发展不平衡的问题。如华北局即报告称：其所辖“各县区镇压反革命情况是不平衡的，有的地方确已完满地完成了镇压反革命的任务，但有的地方仍有少数罪大恶极非杀不足以平民愤的反革命分子，逍遥法外，甚至在积极破坏。至于根本未进行镇反工作，群众完全未发动起来的村庄，也是有的”[59](第一一四期，1951年7月14日，p10)。“静海在镇压反革命后，仍有十六个村庄不抓不杀就不能突破。嘉祥有百分之三十的村庄，还未发动群众起来镇压反革命：博爱尚有百分四十的村庄，对反革命打击不够狠或很少打击，反革命分子仍在顽抗。像这样捕杀不足的地方，如不继续发动群众，严厉镇压反革命，干部和群众自不会也不应满意。”[60](第一一四期，1951年7月14日，p11)特别是像西南地区，因为1951年上半年才陆续开始实行土改，杀地主的工作才刚刚开始，要严格限制杀人比例也完全没有可能性。特别是对收缩方针和死刑缓刑问题，不少地方都发生了思想混乱的情况。用华北局的说法就是：“各地在传达第三次全国公安会议决议后，曾引起一部分群众以至中下级干部的怀疑、不满与情绪低落。”[59]为此，一向高度重视群众情绪的毛泽东，又不能不转而发出指示强调：““缓期二

年执行’的政策，决不应解释为对于负有血债或有其他重大罪行，人民要求处死的罪，而不处死。如果这样做，那就是错误的。我们必须向区村干部和人民群众解释清楚。对于罪大恶极民愤甚深非杀不足平民愤者，必须处死，以平民愤。”[60](第一一四期，1951年7月14日，p12)

正因为如此，第三次全国公安会议决议及中共中央相关指示传达后，大捕大杀的风潮只是在一定程度上减弱了。从以后的情况看，大规模捕人杀人事实上仍在继续，只是宣传上不再大张旗鼓了。仅以华东地区为例，1951年5月统计的数字是，捕人犯358000余名，处决100840余名。10月的统计数字已成为：捕468385名，处决139435名。由此可知，自5月之后的4个月里，华东方面又捕了110000人，并又处决了将近40000人。

此后，虽然根据中共中央的要求，“镇反”运动一度让位给自1951年底开始的“三反”“五反”运动。但1951年11月至1952年8月，各地又展开过新一轮的“镇反”运动，仅华东地区就又捕了71128名，处决了10727名。并且该地区还进一步部署了第三阶段“镇反”工作，要求再捕55000人，处决12279人。以华东第一阶段“镇反”处决139435人即已达到人口总数的千分之零点九四的比例来看，可知三个阶段下来，其被处决人数注定要大大突破千分之一的比例了。[61]在这里，杀人较少的如山东省，第一期镇反结束后，事实上也突破了省委想要控制的不超过千分之零点五的比例，达到了千分之零点五二的水平。[54]

而中南局属下原本已捕杀较多的江西省，第一期镇反处决了17699人，关了26232人，管了20091人：第二期死刑7402人，缓刑532人，关了5954人，管了14013人，病亡及自杀了767人：第三期又处决了1019人，关了13697人，管了4985人。三期镇反合计处决掉25588人，判刑46425人，管制39089人。①以江西省当时人口1600万人②计算的话，其处决人犯的比例也已经突破千分之一点五的最高限度，相当于千分之一点六的水平了。而靠近沿海前线的福建省，则更是破纪录地创造了千之二点四的处决人犯比例。[61]

严格地说，“镇反”中杀人、捕人，多少还有一些授权的限制。即使在1951年6月以前杀人权实际上被下放到县一级，但至少在形式上还要交由上一级机关来审定，当事人或群众还不能过分随意定夺。而杀、关、管的另一个重要环节管制的确定，在农村地区，由于基本上靠当地干部甚或群众掌握，情况就更是严重失控了。在许多地区，尽管中共中央规定被管制的人数比例不应超人口总数的千分之三，实际上几乎所有地区都大大突破了这一比例。

以四川温江县隆平乡为例，据报：“全乡共管制216人，其中一个村就有76人……有道徒13人，流氓25人，地主13人，反革命家属8人，被清洗农会干部5人(地主代理人)，小偷5人，其他7人(还有个别与地主放过鸭子的也管起来了)。”不仅如此，被管制人员还被编为劳改队，被派去从事重体力劳动，如修操场、代耕等等。一些村子的“被管制的人均挨过打”。[24](建西001/461/22)

贵州农村的情况更甚。据新华社记者1953年初报道：“贵州省农村中群众管制坏分子的面宽、量大，已造成某些地区严重的混乱现象。被管制分子大部分都未经过有关公安部门审

查、批准，许多都是由群众或工作组干部说管就管。地主、反革命家属，一般都是全家大小一律管，部分地区将小偷、游民、妓女也大都全家全部管了起来。紫云县四区德兴乡二村共有三百十户，居民一千六百二十七人，管制了二十三户(均全家管)一五〇人，占全乡总人口的千分之九十二强，超过中央规定(千分之三)的三十倍。个别极其严重的如贵定县都禄乡管制面竟占该乡总人口的二分之一。独山县基长乡全乡人口八三六一人，共管制四五六人，去年十二月经西南公安部及省公安厅检查结果，仅十一人符合管制条件，不该管而管的四五四人。紫云县一区松山镇五村，农协主席梁秀清贪污银元一元半，自己说出后，即被该村工作组员陆光美宣布开除农会，管制起来。该县四区德兴乡一被开除的青年团员，因一次在馆子里跟地主同桌吃饭(各自付钱)被管制。紫云县二区四村农民班长元两夫妻打架，被工作组宣布管制一年。独山基长乡平定村罗登云，年已七十八岁，不能行动，亦无反革命活动，仅因其一九二六年曾当过一年伪区长而被当作主要管制对象。”[47](1953年4月13日)

整个“镇反”运动究竟“杀”、“关”、“管”了多少人?毛泽东后来有过一个说法，叫杀了70万，关了120万，管了120万。毛的这个说法自然是有根据的，因为它来自于公安部副部长徐子荣1954年1月的一份报告。徐当时报告称:镇反运动以来，全国共捕了2620000余名，其中“共杀反革命分子712000余名，关了1290000余名，先后管制了1200000。捕后因罪恶不大，教育释放了380000余名。”^③以被处决71.2万这个数字来计算，它已经达到当时全国5亿人口的千分之一点二四的水平了。这个数字，比毛泽东当初设想的千分之一的水平，显然高出了许多。

考虑到像上海等城市只处决了总人口的千分之零点五左右，南京这样被要求多杀的城市也只处决了总人口的千分之一^④，可知农村地区被处决的人数最多，许多地方早已大大突破了千分之一点五，一些省区且已超过千分之二的水平了。如果注意到1951年4月下旬毛泽东及时刹车并委婉批评一些地方太过强调多杀，以至有些地方明显地出现了瞒报的情况，故实际上全国范围实际的处决人数很可能要大大超过71.2万的这个数字。^⑤同样的情况，比较上述贵州农村的管制情况，亦可知其所谓管制数小于判刑数的统计，也未必十分准确。

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DeepL Translation

Yang Kuisong: Research on the “Suppression of Counter-Revolutionary” Movement in New China

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Topics: Mao Zedong, New China, Counterrevolutionary Suppression Movement

● Yang Queisong (Enter the column)

[Abstract] At the beginning of the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), when the war was not yet over, land reform was gradually being carried out, and economic restoration was still in progress, Mao Zedong opposed the idea of “striking on all sides” and did not respond to the Party's demand for large-scale crackdowns, despite the fact that there were frequent rebellions in various places. However, a few months later, when China was forced to send troops to fight against the United States due to the defeat in Korea, Mao seized the opportunity of the foreign war and did not hesitate to launch the “Suppression of Counter-Revolution” campaign, aiming to rid society of counter-revolutionary elements by taking advantage of the country's foreign war. This campaign of suppressing counterrevolution, which centered on the consolidation of urban power, was so vigorous that it greatly deterred all kinds of hostile forces in the society and enhanced the prestige of the new regime.

[Keywords] Mao Zedong: New China: Crackdown Campaign: Counterrevolutionaries

At the beginning of the 1950s, because the new regime was seriously challenged by the old forces, the new China launched a large-scale campaign of “suppressing counter-revolutionaries” . A powerful crackdown took place in towns and cities across the country, and it took only a year or so for the new Chinese government to realize that the new regime was seriously challenged by the old. In only about a year's time, most of the old forces that posed a threat to the new regime, including bullies, landlords, bandits, secret agents, Kuomintang party groups and military, police and political cadres, as well as those who had killed CCP members or caused serious damage to the CCP, were severely punished, thus greatly establishing the authority of the CCP and firmly stabilizing the political status of the new regime, and in particular In particular, it improved the social order in many areas, which had been very volatile and chaotic. Therefore, although the scale of the campaign of “killing,” “locking up,” and “controlling” was unprecedented in the history of the

People's Republic of China, it was to a considerable extent recognized and endorsed by the majority of the people. approval of the majority of the people.

So far, there has not been much in-depth academic research on such a powerful and far-reaching counter-revolutionary movement. The reasons for this are, on the one hand, related to the low degree of openness of the relevant archives, and on the other hand, perhaps more importantly, because the role of the anti-revolutionary campaigns has not been very controversial among mainland scholars among the political campaigns that followed the founding of the People's Republic of China. For, the subsequent anti-rightist movement, anti-rightist leaning movement, the Four Clean-ups Movement, and even the Cultural Revolution Movement, etc., with the same low degree of openness of the archives, have obviously received attention and have produced considerable research results. However, no matter what the reasoning is, whether it is straight or not, as the first of all political movements since the founding of the People's Republic of China, there should always be a factual and academic study, so that people can understand the ins and outs of the campaign, and explore its causes and effects.

The counter-insurgency movement took place at a time when the national agrarian reform movement was in full swing. Although the campaign was mainly urban, it also included counties and townships, and in many places it also affected villages and towns. And a considerable part of the targets of the anti-revolt movement were fugitive landlords and urban and rural bullies, so it was often entangled with the rural land reform to kill landlords and bullies, as well as the “clearing of bandits and anti-hegemony” struggles at that time, and it was not easy to separate them clearly. In addition, the complexity of the movement and the differences of its local actions are also unlimited due to the size of China and the regional differences, so the author does not expect to summarize the whole picture of the movement in a single article. Instead, this article focuses on the process of the formation and change of the specific decisions of Mao Zedong and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in the early period of the founding of the PRC, and their interaction with the local communities, in order to try to describe and analyze the complexities of the formation and development of the movement and its intrinsic problems.

I

Beginning in the fall of 1948, the CCP army swept across North, East, Central, South, Southwest, and Northwest China, starting in the Northeast, and in only two years or so it occupied most of mainland China, establishing a complete system of party and government power control throughout the country, from top to bottom. However, the military victory was not enough to ensure the consolidation and long-term stability of the nascent regime. At the very beginning of the CCP's preparation to fully replace the KMT as the ruling party, Mao Zedong repeatedly warned the whole party not to repeat the mistake of Li Zicheng's entry into the city. At the Politburo meeting in September 1948, Mao especially raised the issue of the importance of class analysis and the strengthening of the concept of class struggle after entering the city. He even went so far as to declare that after entering the city, one must always bear in mind the class position and never forget the class struggle. All documents and articles that speak of the class question are profound: those that do not or are not clear about the question are called superficial. [1] (p1351, 1432~1435)

In fact, both in the cities and in the countryside, and in both the new and the old districts¹, the CCP has constantly encountered localized, but quite fierce, resistance ever since it began to seize power on a large scale.

A report from the North China Bureau in August 1949 reflects the seriousness of such cases in the old districts. The report stated: "I. Arson. Tianjin, Anxin ammunition depot explosion occurred, Linxian burned two warehouses, Beiping tram was burned more than 50, Shijingshan iron and steel laboratory also had a fire, Ji'nan, Taihang my party members village cadres and cadres of wheat was burned dozens of people, thirteen counties in Ji'nan statistics, burned wheat 191,177 acres. Second, killing. Jiluyu twenty-six counties within three months of the statistics of a total of fifty-five killings, the deaths of eighty-eight, most of the counter-revolutionary elements for the bandits killed. Jinan nearly three months within the reactionary rich kill my village dry party members four, Suiyuan Tao Lin two districts stepping Hu hole village landlords collusion with bandits once killed my village cadres and activists twelve people. Since January to date a total of about two hundred and eighty-

eight people (were killed), most of these cases of human life with the Kuomintang agents and counter-revolutionaries related.” [2](p394)

A report from the Southwest Bureau in March 1950 reflects the seriousness of such cases in the new district. The report stated, “Over the past period of time, in the southwestern provinces of Chuan, Kang, Yun and Gui, there have been successive large-scale armed insurrections staged by bandits in various parts of the country.” “Following the February 5 in Chengdu, southwest of Longtan Temple area of nearly 10,000 bandits riot, killing my 179 divisions political director Zhu Xiangli and before hearing to reinforce the troops of more than 50 cadres and soldiers, and then was sent by my troops to wipe out, since February, all over the bandits and siege and occupation, including Wenjiang, Sounkyung, Pixian, Jintang, Xinfeng and east of the Sichuan Xiushan, and many counties. Qionglai city was besieged by ten thousand bandits. Pishan military sub-district overnight eight districts of the regime was attacked by bandits and all lost. Pingtang county I local staff was killed by bandits more than eighty people. In Zhongxiao Township, 40 women between the ages of 16 and 20 were taken away by bandits. The next day, He Yang Township to Pingtang, twenty-one women were stripped naked by bandits, seven people were raped, two military personnel were raped and then taken. Qingzhen County, belonging to the chicken farm, within three days by the bandits twice looted, the first was robbed residents of thirteen households, the second village of more than ninety households were robbed, and was killed by the bandits more than seventy people, eight merchants were thrown into the fire burned alive. Another bandit leader Zeng Shao Hua nearly tens of thousands of people attacked Guizhou University and Huaxi City three times in a row, killing many students and employees, and successively captured more than ninety students of both sexes: Changshun County, the leader of the bandits Zhi Chaochu with a knife and hacked to death my deputy governor, the county government ministers, section chiefs and other four people alive. Chengdu-Chongqing, Chengdu-Chongqing, Chongqing-Guizhou several important highways, Chongqing-Lu and other waterways were all cut off by the bandits: Rongya, Sichuan-Xiang road bridges were all destroyed. The bandits even organized children to intercept my military vehicles, snatch the supplies and kill my cadres and soldiers escorting the vehicles. This kind of tragedy has happened one after another in recent days, and it is impossible to enumerate them all. At the same time, individual Nationalist insurgent forces, under the planning of some bandits, have also mutinied. For example, the former KMT Li Zhen Corps and the 61st Division of the 27th Army,

the 123rd Division of the 20th Army, and so on. At present, according to preliminary estimates, only the western region, a variety of open activities of the bandits up to one 0 four shares, small shares of dozens, hundreds of people, large shares of more than 10,000 people together, totaling no less than 60,000 bandits. And, there continues to be an extremely rapid rate of spread and development of the trend.” [3](p183~184)

Noting that after the official proclamation of the People's Republic of China, the destructive activities of enemy agents and bandits had a tendency to become more and more serious, Liu Shaoqi, who was presiding over the work of the CPC Central Committee due to Mao Zedong's return from his visit to the USSR for a temporary respite, issued instructions one after another at this time, requesting that all places crack down on the counter-revolutionary destructive elements. Under his auspices, in March 1950, the CPC Central Committee issued the Instructions on the Eradication of Bandits and the Establishment of a New Revolutionary Order and the Instructions on the Suppression of Counterrevolutionary Activities. [4](p159) The Ministry of Public Security also accordingly carried out registration of hostile party elements in many cities, and through a combination of up and down methods such as warnings and denunciations, forced former KMT secret service agents and their backbones of the Kuomintang and the Three Youth Leagues to voluntarily give an account of their identities, so as to map out and queue up the hostile elements in the cities and to grasp their status. According to the report of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CCP in March, from the time of its entry into the city to the time of the report, Beijing had arrested, trained and registered more than 6,900 hostile elements of the secret services, of whom the registrants accounted for more than half. According to statistics from Zhejiang Province alone, more than 110,000 reactionary party members have been registered. According to the statistics of Shandong Province, the number of registered counter-revolutionary elements of the five types of bandits, landlords, reactionary Taoist leaders, secret agents and reactionary party cadres amounted to 137,599. ②

At the same time, Liu Shaoqi also issued instructions one after another, requesting that counterrevolutionaries be severely suppressed in various places, and on March 28, Liu gave a clear instruction to the Political Department of the East China Military Region and the Third Field Army

on the notification of the cases of bandits and special agents cracked down in the South Anhui Military Region on the 23rd of March: “Recently, there has not been enough suppression of counterrevolutionaries in various places, which encourages counterrevolutionary activities, and those who still carry out counterrevolutionary activities even after leniency must be given a clear indication that the counterrevolutionary activities are not enough, but must be suppressed. For those who, after lenient treatment, are still engaged in counter-revolutionary activities, they must be sentenced to long terms of imprisonment or even the death penalty. In this connection, I hope that the Ministry of Public Security and the judicial organs will immediately issue a directive to the localities, and I ask Mr. Dong (Bibi Wu - cited) and Comrade Luo Rui-Qing to prepare a directive for issuance.” [5] (p613) on the 29th, he also in the Railway Minister Teng Daiyuan the previous day on the situation of banditry and special sabotage of railroads to the Military Commission and the Central Finance Commission of the report on the approved: “These saboteurs must be dealt with severely, not dealt with severely, not to give terror is not right. The Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of Railways that is to discuss ways to notify the localities, criticizing the phenomenon of paralysis everywhere.” [6](p613)

On the 30th, realizing that after the agreement on the Sino-Soviet Joint Stock Company was published in the press, students in some places took to the streets in protest, Liu Shaoqi also immediately related the problem of counter-revolutionaries. He pointed out: “In the vast majority of the masses this suspicion is due to childish nationalist sentiments, but the counter-revolutionaries are bound to take advantage of it to go on a rampage, and in doing so to reveal their counter-revolutionary appearance. This must be closely watched by the Party and Reunion Committees and the public security departments everywhere.” “Particular attention must be paid to those elements who make radical counter-revolutionary proposals and actions of all kinds, to take note of what they say and do, and to reconnoitre them in order to discover counter-revolutionary acts and counter-revolutionary organizations among them, which can then be broken up by the public security departments at an appropriate time.” “Counter-revolutionaries for whom there is indeed evidence must be severely and thoroughly suppressed after sufficient reconnaissance and preparation.” [7] (p615~616)

At the repeated promptings of Liu Shaoqi and the Central Committee of the CCP, the leaders of the various departments concerned also voiced their calls and demands for a severe suppression of the counter-revolutionaries. Especially worth mentioning here is Peng Zhen's report, which was influential in shaping the subsequent counter-revolutionary movement. Peng Zhen said in his report that, in accordance with the instructions of the Central Committee, the Political and Legal Committee sent two working groups to Xuanhua in Chahar Province and Tangshan in Hebei Province to carry out judicial investigations, and found that “after correctly correcting the bias of ‘indiscriminate beatings and killings,’ the policy of leniency in quite a number of places now deviates to the point of ‘leniency without bounds. ‘Leniency knows no bounds’, leniency to ‘destroy their own aspirations, long banditry’, leniency to encourage banditry, detached from the people to the extent.” In this connection, the report cites the following example: “In some places, the death penalty is not imposed on reactionary leaders who have committed heinous crimes and have even killed more than a hundred of our cadres, county governors and many of our cadres, and bandits who have killed many of the masses: or the death penalty is imposed by a lower court but changed to a prison sentence by a higher court.” In many other places, there is a huge backlog of cases due to the inadequacy of the courts: cases of banditry for which a decision on the sentence has already been taken are often delayed for so long that they become time-barred. This situation has led to an increase in banditry, and “the people in the new and semi-old districts are very afraid of the bandits and agents, and they have adopted a duplicitous approach to the bandits and our security personnel. Even some village cadres, out of fear of being victimized by the bandits and “sufferings,” kept their knowledge of the bandits secret. The masses regarded the government's call for the elimination of bandits and traitors as empty talk and gave it a very cold reception.” ①

Peng Zhen's report pointedly raised the issue that government organs at all levels, especially courts at all levels, were “lenient without bounds” , leading to the arrogance of the bandits and traitors, which not only pushed the State Council and the Supreme People's Court to jointly promulgate the “Instruction on Suppressing Counterrevolutionary Activities” on July 23,[8] (p358~360) but also became an important factor in the development of the large-scale counterrevolutionary campaign thereafter. an important basis for the development of large-scale counter-revolutionary campaigns.

However, with regard to all the above, including the instructions and deployment of Liu Shaoqi and the relevant departments to vigorously suppress it, Mao Zedong did not give any corresponding instructions for a long time. As mentioned earlier, Mao Zedong had already emphasized the issue of class struggle again and again before entering the city, and he had always been the most resolute advocate of violent revolution and class dictatorship, including on the eve of the CCP Central Committee's entry into the city, when he was still emphasizing that the Communist regime was “dictatorial, autocratic, and autocratic with respect to all counterrevolutionary elements,” and that therefore, it was necessary to “purge the whole country of counter-revolutionaries” . After entering the city, he even openly declared: There is only violence and despotism against the reactionaries, never benevolent rule, “either kill the tiger or be eaten by the tiger, one of the two must be the other.” ② Therefore, it was impossible for Mao not to pay attention to the suppression of counterrevolution.

Why was Mao not very positive about carrying out a counter-revolutionary campaign at this time? This is because, from the very beginning, he had already noticed that the problem of dealing with the counter-revolution was made much more complicated by the fact that the new China had to set up a coalition government of the nature of a united front. He made this clear when he explained his ideas to the Russians at the beginning of 1949, saying: if a one-party government is established, it will be much easier to do so; if a coalition government is established, it “will certainly bring about trouble” because the Communist Party must take into account the attitudes of the other political parties and cannot simply act according to its own wishes.[9] He also emphasized the need for a united front government to deal with the counter-revolution. [9](p22) Precisely because of the need to establish a coalition government, Mao Zedong was extremely cautious even about the occupation of the big cities³, and even more worried about the danger of the imperialists “organizing the so-called opposition to sabotage the revolution from the inside” after the establishment of the new government.⁴ He had repeatedly warned the Party about the danger of the imperialists “organizing the so-called opposition to sabotage the revolution from the inside” . He had already repeatedly warned the Party that “after the enemies with guns have been eliminated, the enemies without guns will still exist, and they will inevitably fight us to the death, and we must not take them lightly. [10] (p1428) Mao Zedong especially emphasized that the Communists should avoid repeating the mistakes made by Li Zicheng, and emphasized that after entering the city, they should be vigilant

not to be hit by the sugar-coated shells of the bourgeoisie, also for this reason. But it was also because he was aware of the complexity of the situation he would face after entering the city that, from the very beginning of the founding of the country, Mao was careful to avoid any action that might have a significant impact on all sides.

For example, upon his return from Moscow in March 1950, Mao immediately proposed, in response to the widespread agrarian reform movement that was underway at the time, that China's agrarian reform should learn from the experience of the Soviet Union, and that the rich peasants' land should be left untouched for the time being. There are three reasons for this: “The first is that the unprecedented scale of the land reform is so great that it is easy to have a leftist bias; if only the landlords are moved and the rich peasants are not moved, it will be more possible to isolate the landlords, protect the middle peasants and prevent indiscriminate killings, which would otherwise be difficult to prevent” : “The second is that the land reform in the north in the past was carried out in the midst of the war, and the war has completely covered the air of land reform, and now there is basically no more land reform. Secondly, in the past, the land reform in the north was carried out in the midst of the war, and the war completely covered up the air of the land reform; now that there is basically no more war, the land reform will be particularly prominent, and the vibration given to the society will be very significant, and the landlords' voice of clamor will be particularly sharp. If we do not move the semi-feudal rich peasants for the time being, and wait until a few years later to move them, it will appear that we have more reason, that is to say, more political initiative: thirdly, the united front between us and the national bourgeoisie has now been formed politically, economically and organizationally, and the national bourgeoisie is closely connected with the land question; for the sake of stabilizing the national bourgeoisie it seems more appropriate to keep the semi-feudal rich peasants inactive for the time being. It seems more appropriate to leave the semi-feudal rich peasants alone for the time being in order to stabilize the national bourgeoisie.” ① Mao's central idea here is very clear, that is, to emphasize the need for a united front policy, and to ask the Party to pay attention to the use of tactics, to strike at the enemy separately, so as not to irritate the target of the united front too much and make it dissatisfied.

In June 1950, the CPC Central Committee held the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, at which Mao Zedong made a report. In his written report, he distinctly In his written report, he affirmed the extreme necessity of suppressing counterrevolution, pointing out that all counterrevolutionaries “are instigated by imperialism, especially U.S. imperialism,” and “are the lackeys of imperialism,” and that all bandits, agents, bullies and other counterrevolutionary elements must be resolutely purged. However, when he orally explained the idea of the report, he clearly told the participants that, although the report was comprehensive and covered all aspects of work, the center of gravity of all the work at present was still “the struggle for the basic improvement of the country's financial and economic situation” . Why can't the purging of counter-revolutionary work be regarded as the top priority? He gave a detailed explanation. First, ” he said, ” we have already completed land reform in the north in an area of about 160 million people. This fall, we will begin land reform in such a vast area of about 310 million people and overthrow the entire landlord class. In agrarian reform, our enemies are big enough and numerous enough.”

Secondly, the victory of the revolution caused a socio-economic reorganization. Coupled with the fact that the war had already brought much destruction, many people were dissatisfied with us. In particular, “our relations with the national bourgeoisie are now strained, and they are discontented with us” , while the unemployed intellectuals and unemployed workers caused by the destruction of the war and the reorganization of the economy are also dissatisfied with us, as are a group of small handicraftsmen, including a part of the peasantry. Therefore, our first and foremost task in the city at present is “to rationalize industry and commerce, to bring factories into operation, to solve the problem of unemployment, and to take out two billion pounds of grain to solve the problem of feeding the unemployed workers, so that the unemployed workers will embrace us.” At the same time, “through the rationalization of industry and commerce and the adjustment of taxes,” relations with the national bourgeoisie were to be improved. Through the organization of various universities and the use of intellectuals, so that they will not oppose us. In the countryside, on the other hand, it is to make the masses of peasants support us through rent and interest reductions, the suppression of banditry and anti-bullying, and land reform. In short, “it is to turn those among the people who are dissatisfied with us into those who support us” , or at least not to turn them against us. In other words, Mao's idea was simple: “Do not strike on all sides” and “do not make too

many enemies.” In his words, “It is not good to strike on all sides and make the whole country nervous.” It is not that we should not engage in a campaign to suppress the counter-revolution, but that we should prioritize, “we must not be impatient in any case, and if we are in a hurry, something will go wrong.” “It is necessary to make concessions and moderation on one side and concentrate on attacking the other.” [11](p397~400) This is in fact a political application of Mao's military strategy of “attacking from each side” .

Two

Mao Zedong's political operations were characterized by a high degree of tactical flexibility. But it is also clear that Mao was never a stickler for convention. The purpose of war is to defeat the enemy, and all strategies are applied to serve this purpose. Therefore, when the war situation changed, it became a necessity to quickly adjust the established strategies in pursuit of better results. This was exactly the case with Mao's change of strategy on the issue of suppressing counter-revolution.

In June 1950 Mao also strongly advised his Party comrades not to be impatient and to avoid striking on all sides. However, a few months later, with the outbreak of the Korean War, in which the North Korean People's Army soon lost and the Chinese side had to prepare to send in troops, he immediately changed his earlier less-than-enthusiastic attitude towards the issue of suppressing counter-revolution. He realized that this was a “once-in-a-lifetime opportunity” to completely eliminate counter-revolutionaries in the country. Therefore, the CPC Central Committee formally decided to send troops to Korea on October 8, and two days later, he personally presided over the adoption of the new “Instruction on Suppressing Counterrevolutionary Activities” (also known as the “Double Ten” Instruction), which was aimed at deploying a large-scale crackdown on counterrevolutionary activities throughout the country.

Mao Zedong's decision to send troops to North Korea and his determination to suppress counterrevolutionary activities were naturally based on the practical need to fight against foreign aggression and to stabilize the domestic situation. In addition to the aforementioned old forces

hostile to the Communist Party, which were quite active, the activities of KMT agents alone posed a great threat to the security of the CCP's rear and the secrecy of its military operations. It was reported that in less than a year, 177 cases of secret agents had been uncovered in Beijing by the end of September, 73 in Tianjin in 12 months, 22 in plains province in nine months, 60 in Suiyuan province in six months, and 183 in Henan province in eight months. According to a public report in the People's Daily, "From October of last year to September of this year, more than thirteen thousand secret agents have been captured by our public security departments, and several cases of espionage directly carried out by the U.S. imperialists in China have been uncovered, with a total of one hundred and seventy-five radio stations of the secret services seized." ②

And the outbreak of the Korean War, especially the large-scale involvement of the United States and its United Nations forces, had originally created a certain panic mentality in society. Various rumors spread by secret agents and various old forces dissatisfied with the CCP regime had even caused panic among the people in many remote areas and rural villages. There were even incidents in some places where landlords and old rich peasants who had already been dispossessed carried out counter-attacks. In the most serious places, an average of seven or eight cases occurred in one county in one province.

Under these circumstances, the influence and role of the old social organizations such as the Consistent Way naturally came to the fore. Not only are they numerous, but many local grass-roots Party and government officials are also deeply involved in them and are under their sway, thus causing serious uneasiness among the local Party and government. According to the North China Bureau of the Communist Party of China reported: "In the activities of the Society of Taoist sects, Hebei found that there are four hundred and one kinds of Taoist disciples without provincial statistics, only six counties of Shimen that is, all kinds of Taoist disciples of about sixty-four thousand people: Shanxi one hundred and fifty kinds of Taoist disciples, only consistent Taoist that is up to more than eighty-one million people: plains eighty-two kinds of Taoist disciples of about thirty thousand people: more than fifty kinds of Chahaer, the Taoist disciples of about two hundred thousand people: more than twenty kinds of Suiyuan,: Beijing In Beijing, there are thirty-eight kinds of Taoist sects, with 200,000 Taoist disciples in the Shengtongdao alone: in Tianjin, there are more

than ten kinds of Taoist sects, and the Shengtongdao, the Qing Gang, and the World Buddhist Association each have about 100,000 people. In terms of the whole region, the Consistent Dao is the most widely distributed and the most reactionary, with a total of about 1.5 million Taoists in the region, and only in Xinxian County, Shanxi, there are about 190,000 Consistent Dao practitioners, accounting for 14.6 percent of the population of the region, and even other Taoist sects, accounting for 17.7 percent of the population. Every village in Thin Mountain County has a consistent Taoist practice, and seventy-four percent of the rural branches in Dai County are attended by Party members, and eighteen percent of the less than 3,000 Party members in the county participate in the consistent Taoist practice. The Yanbei local committee of Chia province investigated 900 party members, that is, 500 of them participated in the consistent way, of which 100 party members preferred to withdraw from the party but not from the way. The upper class of the Way is mostly landlords, rich peasants and reactionary old soldiers of the Kuomintang, and the general practitioners of the Way are mostly middle-poor peasants. The majority of these meeting and Taoist sects, especially the Consistent Tao and the Longhua Society, have been grasped and utilized by the secret service organizations and have become powerful tools for counter-revolutionary activities.” [12](p557~560)

Since such a social base existed in the countryside everywhere, the result naturally facilitated the resistance activities of the KMT's underground infiltrators and dispatchers. According to the report of the North China Bureau, “the counter-revolutionary activities of the bandits and agents are no longer confined to such dastardly acts as covert rumor-mongering, assassination, breaking up of lines, breaking up of roads, and so on, but have gone on to the stage of open and direct armed insurrection” . They are either “actively expanding their forces and organizing reactionary arms” or “liaising with old Party agents, manipulating bandits and carrying out the so-called ‘guerrillas behind the enemy lines’ ” . Before and after the issuance of the “Double Ten” Instruction, more than a dozen riots of various kinds took place in North China alone. Some of the larger ones were the “Yellow Soldier Road” armed riot in Wuan County, Hebei Province; the attack on the five district offices and the county office by stray Kuomintang officials and soldiers in Jishan County, Shanxi Province; and the “Quanfo Avenue Association” riot in Tong County, Hebei Province. As the central commanding body of the counter-revolutionary movement, the Ministry of Public Security of the Central Committee at this time clearly believed that the fundamental reason

for the abnormal activity of reactionary organizations in various places was that there were too many counter-revolutionaries and they were not being suppressed effectively. After synthesizing the situation throughout the country, it submitted a special report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at this time. First, nationwide, “from January 1949 to August this year, about 25,041 agents were captured and only 639 were executed. Of the 135 major cases solved between October of last year and September of this year, only a dozen or so were reported as having been dealt with. The fact that only four people have been killed since the liberation of Nanjing until September of this year, that only two counter-revolutionaries have been killed since the liberation of Qingdao until July of this year, and that not a single person has been killed since the liberation of Jian'ou County in Fujian, which is seriously plagued by banditry, until August of this year is sufficient to illustrate the seriousness of the insufficient suppression.”

Secondly, the punishment for serious crimes was light and late, and the suppression was not timely. For example, in Shijiazhuang, Wang Jun, the chief of the “19th” secret service organization, was recently sentenced to death after a delay of three years. In Xi'an, where bandits resisted arrest and killed my letter carrier, the Xi'an court considered it “self-defense” and did not sentence him to death. The Nanjing bandits who resisted arrest and shot my public security officer were sentenced to death on the grounds of “first offense”, but were sentenced to imprisonment instead. The counter-revolutionary mutiny of Zhang Zhaqiang's troops, which I cracked, was considered by some to be an “attempted mutiny”. Counter-revolutionary prisoners were said to have committed mutiny because we had not educated them enough, and because we emphasized that no matter how big or small the crime, no one should be blamed for it. As for the approval of judgments, the procedures are numerous, and East China says that the fastest time is two or three months, while the slowest time is two or three years. The courts are inadequate and there is a strong view of the old law among the old judicial personnel.

Thirdly, as a result of insufficient and untimely suppression, the formation of this place to release, the other side of the crime, today's release, tomorrow's crime, the detainees are a large number of backlog, so that the prisoners escaped one after another, riots. [13] (No. 93, November 15, 1950, pp. 16-17) The “Double Ten” instructions were undoubtedly based on the above judgment of the

situation. The instructions clearly stated: “On the question of suppressing counter-revolution, a serious rightward bias has occurred, so that a large number of the first and foremost counter-revolutionaries, who are unrepentant and continue to be evil even after the liberation of the country and even after leniency treatment, have not been duly sanctioned.” [14](p235~236) But it is certain that the key to the “Double Ten” crackdown did not lie in the sudden severity of the enemy's situation, nor was it even due to the consideration that to fight against the outside world, one must first pacify the inside world. For Mao, the suppression of the counterrevolution was one of the major steps that the Communist Party had decided to take long after its founding, and the only consideration was the proper timing. In the face of the powerful momentum of the upcoming war against the United States, Mao Zedong made a snap decision to call for the removal of counter-revolutionaries with great fanfare, just because he believed that such a time had come.

In this regard, Mao Zedong had clearly explained to Luo Ruiqing, the Minister of Public Security, at this time. He said, “Why couldn't we suppress counterrevolutionaries in large numbers before this? It was because the time was not ripe, our financial problems had not yet been solved, and relations with the bourgeoisie were still tense. It would have been inappropriate for us to propose a massive suppression of the counter-revolution at that time. Now the situation is different, the financial and economic problems have basically been solved, and the war against the U.S. has been fought, therefore, “You should not waste this time; I am afraid that the suppression of counter-revolution will only come once, and there will be no more. It is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity, so you should make good use of this capital, not exactly for the purpose of killing a few counter-revolutionaries, but more mainly for the purpose of mobilizing the masses.” ②

Liu Shaoqi's subsequent explanation was even more graphic. He said: The key to why the campaign to suppress the counterrevolution could be carried out with great fanfare was the war against the U.S. and North Korea. “The anti-U.S.-aid war was very beneficial, and it made a lot of things better for us (e.g., carrying out agrarian reform, making patriotic pacts, organizing production competitions, suppressing counter-revolution, etc.). Because the gongs and drums of the anti-U.S.-Aid and North Korea campaign sounded and rang so loudly, the gongs and drums of land reform and the gongs and drums of the anti-revolt campaign could not be heard so much, and it was then

better to carry out the campaign. If the gongs and drums of the anti-U.S. and anti-DPRK resistance did not sound so loudly, the gongs and drums of the land reform (and the suppression of rebellion) would not be heard at all. A landlord was killed here and there, and there was a lot of trouble", and 'many things were not easy to handle' . ③

Obviously, based on the experience of past revolutions, Mao Zedong was quite aware that such large-scale repression would not only have a strong deterrent effect on the old anti-communist forces, but would also serve as a rather graphic political education for the grassroots, and would greatly establish the political authority of the new regime. This was particularly important to the communists who had just gained national power.

Therefore, the "Double Ten" Instruction, in particular in accordance with Mao's opinion, clearly stated that in this crackdown on the counter-revolution, special attention should be paid to the educational effect on the masses. This was done by saying: "Those who are to be killed should be sentenced to death immediately. Those who are to be imprisoned and reformed should be arrested and imprisoned immediately and reformed. For the execution of these cases, it is necessary to publicize the verdicts, publish the information in newspapers (in a prominent position), and adopt other methods to carry out extensive propaganda and education among the masses." [14] Although the "Double Ten" Instruction criticized the "rightward bias" of "unbounded leniency" and emphasized "severe sanctions", it did not propose severe sanctions. Although the "Double Ten" instructions criticized the "rightist bias" of "unbounded leniency" and emphasized "severe sanctions," they did not set forth the criteria for severe punishment. The directive called on all localities to "suppress counterrevolutionary activities in accordance with the regulations on the punishment of counterrevolutionary activities promulgated by the State Council of the Central People's Government", which had not yet been promulgated. In addition, the instructions still emphasized the need to prevent a "left" bias, continued to call for "evidence rather than confession" and stipulated that "when the death penalty is imposed, the Party must obtain the approval of the Provincial Party Committee, the Municipal Party Committee, the District Party Committee, and the local Party Committee entrusted with the task", while the local Party Committee was not yet in a position to approve the death penalty. The local committees were

already overloaded with work and had had the experience of the Central Committee's previous instructions to “crack down” on several occasions, so it was clear that most places did not attach great importance to it at the beginning. (1)

According to the time set by the “Double Ten” instructions, all localities should submit reports to the Central Committee by November 10 and come up with plans for the “crackdown”. However, it was not until mid- to late November that a few places, including the Southwest Bureau, the North China Bureau and Beijing, sent their reports and plans to the Central Committee. Mao's approval of these reports showed that he did not yet have any specific and mature ideas about the “counter-revolution” approach, and thus attached particular importance to local ideas and practices. Therefore, he attached particular importance to local concepts and practices. Therefore, he was obviously too general about some of the proposals, such as the Southwest Bureau's proposal that “those who have committed great crimes and evils” should be resolutely executed, “those who have committed great crimes and evils” should be sentenced to imprisonment or imprisonment, and “those who have committed lesser crimes and evils” should be released and put to death. The “lesser evils” can be properly controlled after their release, and at the same time, “all counter-revolutionary dealings must be analyzed specifically, strategically, and treated differently, so as to achieve the purpose of suppressing counter-revolution and disintegrating and dividing the enemy”, Mao Zedong explicitly endorsed the proposal. The Beijing Municipal Party Committee's proposal of “first dealing with secret agents, then with reactionary party groups, and finally with all kinds of reactionary feudal forces”, and striving to be precise, steady and hard, with no exact criteria for cracking down, were also fully recognized and vigorously promoted to all parts of the country. ②

Some places began to move, that is, in accordance with the requirements of the “Double Ten” instructions, public judgment, release of information, and make a big noise. However, this aroused a certain degree of concern on the part of the CCP Central Committee. This is because, in the history of the CPC, there have been repeated cases of the expansion of the anti-purge movement, coupled with the land reform in North China in 1947 and the phenomenon of indiscriminate arrests and killings that occurred in some places after the entry into the city in 1949, which had to be corrected. Therefore, the campaign was just launched more than a month, Liu Shaoqi began to urgently deploy

moderate cooling, but also emphasized the need to pay attention to strategy. Liu Shaoqi made it clear at the meeting of senior cadres that “the suppression of counter-revolution should be carried out in a planned and orderly manner, and so should the work of propaganda and reporting. That is to say, there should be a plan and focus to carry out propaganda work. For important cases, which had a great impact on the masses and dealt a great blow to the activities of the secret agents, important news must be released, together with newsletters, short commentaries, editorials and other systematic reports, in order to inspire the masses to fight against the traitors and the secret agents and to polarize the bandits, so as to achieve the effect of killing one as a warning to the others. However, for general cases that do not have much impact on the education of the masses, they need not and should not be reported piece by piece. Since there will be more suppression in the future, if we have to report on every killing, and publicize the killings too much in the newspapers, we are afraid of side-effects, such as making some people suspect that we have “killed too many people” and “acted too harshly,” and so on.” [15] (No. 95, December 6, 1950, p1~2)

Not only that, Liu Shaoqi and others apparently believed that there still needed to be a limit to the extent to which the counter-revolution could be suppressed with great fanfare, and that special attention had to be paid to keeping a sense of proportion. Not only should attention be paid to strategy in propaganda, but also in killing. Chuandong District Party Committee at this time, there are instructions that: “since the new banditry in the group leader of the Special above the professional agents should be sent to the Public Security Office of the Executive Office of the management of training, a few of them have a blood debt should be sentenced to death,” Liu Shaoqi explicitly instructed: “will be the end of the sentence of the death penalty to be deleted,” .

“Bandits and specialists, including the prime elements, have already surrendered to me and are no longer engaged in counter-revolutionary activities, even if they had blood debts in the past, they should not be killed.” [16] (p553) The East China Bureau reported at this time that they had corrected their excessively lenient bias since June, and that from January to October they had cracked 2,195 secret agent cases (lacking Fujian Province), arrested 14,080 secret agents, cracked 103 radio stations, and together with other counter-revolutionary bandits and others, had sentenced 2,911 people to death and 13,093 to imprisonment, and had registered 101,636 reactionary groups and 154,592 people who had clues. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) gave a clear approval to this. The Central Committee of the CPC gave a clear reply: “In the

suppression of counter-revolutionaries, if a place has already killed a lot of people, it is possible to relax a little bit at the right time, that is to say, to extend the time of mass executions a little bit, so as to ease the tense air in all walks of life, and at this time the newspapers should not publish too much, that is to say, to publish the executions of the major criminals only, and the secondary criminals do not need to be published in the newspaper. “ ③

At this time, the campaign had only just begun, except for Beijing, Tianjin and a small number of grassroots, most areas had not yet really acted, mobilization, propaganda and education of the masses have not yet created a momentum, Mao Zedong may not want to immediately come to tie the hands of cadres at all levels. The most typical example is Liu Shaoqi's instruction that self-rehabilitationists should not be sentenced to death, which Mao Zedong specifically amended to read:

“If the masses, who have a great debt of blood, demand that the death penalty be imposed, and estimate that the situation will be more favorable if the death penalty is carried out than if it is not carried out, then the death penalty may also be carried out.” [17](p553~554) But at the beginning of the founding of the country, and at the same time in the war against the United States and the land reform movement at the same time, in the country's hundreds of millions of people to carry out such a large-scale political campaign, Mao Zedong for a moment can not help but be cautious.

When the Propaganda Department of the Southwest Bureau, on the instructions of the Central Committee's Higher Cadres' Meeting, reviewed the Xinhua Daily's “very un-strategic” publication of news about the purging of bandits and the fight against hegemony, Mao Zedong gave special instructions to the localities to learn a lesson from the incident, agreeing that it should not create “a very tense air” . Mao Zedong then instructed the localities to learn a lesson from the incident and agreed not to create “a very tense atmosphere” . ④ When the Central and South Bureau proposed that “the crackdown on counter-revolution” “must emphasize the importance of fighting accurately and steadily, and must be prepared, focused, differentiated and measured” and that “the two important fronts of the crackdown on counter-revolution and the land reform in the struggle against the U.S. must be closely coordinated, so that these two fronts will be closely coordinated and the two fronts will be closely coordinated. They must be closely coordinated, so that the tactical steps of these fronts are well coordinated to achieve the effect of mutual support,

rather than striking on many fronts without strategy, causing tension in the whole situation and isolating oneself.” Mao Zedong also highly affirmed this and instructed, “This is a question of a complete set of strategies for suppressing counter-revolution; if it is not clarified among the cadres and closely grasped, there is a possibility that it will be exploited by the counter-revolution, displeased by the democrats, and disagreeable to the people, and that it may lead the Party into a passive state.” [18] (p751~752)

When Huang Kecheng suggested that it would be inappropriate to take a hasty approach to the post-liberation uprising officers in Hunan, who were not guilty of any crime, and that it would be inadvisable to arrest too many of them, except for the individual particularly reactionary ones, who should be arrested and punished, or else they would cause great alarm, Mao Zedong explicitly instructed him to “deal with them in accordance with the views of Huang Dian.” [19] (p5~6) affected by this, some provinces, such as Henan province, nearly a year of execution of 3000 people, is sensitive to find around the arrests and killings have begun to appear hasty phenomenon, noted that the democrats, industrial and commercial circles, intellectuals and students are “some vibration”, and therefore just into the 1951 January, was rapidly It was decided that arrests and killings would generally stop. Mao Zedong also sent the same telegrams to Henan and other places to express his approval of this cautious approach. [20](p46)

Of course, the leaders of the Central Bureaus would not take exception to this suggestion of Mao. Therefore, as soon as Mao Zedong returned to Beijing from abroad in early May, he immediately sought out Luo Ruiqing and ordered Luo to immediately convene a national public security conference to deploy a full-scale contraction. At the same time, he also telegraphed to the persons in charge of the central and southwestern regions, asking them to “pay serious attention” to the situation of the “crackdown” on arrests and killings that had gotten out of hand. (3) He telegraphed to the South China Branch, saying: “In view of the fact that more than 57,000 people have been killed in South China, and that there are still more than 160,000 prisoners in custody, the two provinces and one city in South China should, like those in Henan, Hubei, Hunan, and Jiangxi, stop arresting people for four months from June 1, concentrate on clearing up the backlog of cases, summarize the experience, and educate the cadres.” ④

The urgency of Mao's attitude at this time was described by Luo Ruiqing at the subsequent Central Propaganda Work Conference. He said, "Originally we were going to hold this meeting in June or July, but that day the chairman said no, it had to be held right away, and set the time for it to be held on May 10th. I said, "Now the work of suppressing counter-revolution in the city is rather urgent in all aspects, so I am afraid it is not good to hold the meeting immediately. He said, "It is precisely because it is urgent that it should be held at once." [55]

The resolutions of the Third National Public Security Conference, convened at Mao's suggestion, were basically revised and formulated under Mao's personal supervision. The conference recognized that "in the later stages of the campaign, there were a number of places where simple and crude phenomena occurred, where some of those who could be killed but could not be killed were killed, and some of those who could be arrested but could not be arrested were arrested," but those who were fundamentally mistaken had not yet been examined. Under these circumstances, the campaign to suppress the counter-revolution must be promptly changed "from a bold and liberal approach to an appropriately contracted one." [55]

Mao Zedong again began to say: On the question of suppressing counter-revolution, right-leaning is better than left-leaning. If you say you will correct it, you can get up tomorrow, and it is easy to correct it: if you go left, it is not easy to do it later. In short, "you can't kill too many people; if you kill too many people, you will lose social sympathy and the labor force" . Accordingly, the Resolutions of the Third National Public Security Conference made it clear: "With regard to the number of counter-revolutionary killings, it must be kept within a certain proportion. The authority to authorize arrests should be withdrawn from counties to the level of local committees and special commissions, and the authority to authorize killings should be withdrawn from local and special commissions to the level of provinces and autonomous regions." "Anyone who is between arrestable and non-arrestable must not be arrested; if he is arrested, he is committing a mistake: anyone who is between killable and non-killable must not be killed; if he is killed, he is committing a mistake." [54]

The CCP Central Committee also issued a special directive specifically addressing the issue of senior democrats and their families. The instructions recognized that “some non-party members of the Central People's Government, members of the State Council, and other senior democrats have been killed, arrested, ‘swept away’, or had some of their property in the cities confiscated in the agrarian reforms and counter-revolutionary rebellions because of their family members and relatives, and this has aroused a great deal of anxiety and dissatisfaction, and has caused great anxiety about the united front. discontent, and has had an extremely bad influence on the united front.” Thus it is demanded: “For those democrats, especially senior democrats, who have begun to take part in the struggle against Chiang before liberation and who have already cooperated with us, and for those officers who have really risen up in rebellion, special care or leniency must be intentionally accorded to them in the agrarian reforms and counter-revolutionary efforts. They must not be treated indistinguishably from reactionary landlords and reactionary officers. reactionary landlords and reactionary officers.” Not only should they not be “swept off their land” and have their urban property confiscated, but “even if they have some bad deeds, they should be persuaded as far as possible to bow down and admit their faults to the masses and seek closure without being arrested. Those who should be arrested and sentenced should be dealt with leniently” . When arrests and executions were necessary, they had to be reported to the Central Bureau and the Central Committee for approval and record. [56] (p432-433)

In fact, even before the National Public Security Conference was formally convened, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, on the basis of Mao Zedong's suggestions, had issued instructions on the question of withdrawing the right to arrest and kill and on the handling of counter-revolutionaries within the Party, the government, the military, and the mass organizations, and in particular put forward a method of sentencing with a suspended sentence of death that would avoid the need for more killings. The central thrust of the directive was to specify for the first time clearly the criteria for killing, namely: “Only those who have a blood debt: those who have committed other major crimes that have aroused the resentment of the masses, such as those who have raped many women, plundered much property, and those who have most seriously harmed the interests of the State.” “All the rest adopt the policy of imposing the death penalty with a two-year reprieve and compulsory labor during the reprieve period to see what happens.” The Central Committee of the CCP emphasized: This method can avoid mistakes, gain the sympathy of the

general public, and divide counterrevolutionary forces, while at the same time preserving a large number of laborers, killing several birds with one stone, and should therefore be promoted and practiced as much as possible. Including counter-revolutionaries in the countryside, in addition to those who must be killed if the people demand it, the policy of reprieve from death should also be adopted for some. [57] (p246~247)

The Central Bureaus and their subordinate provincial and municipal sub-district Party committees were usually quite prompt in carrying out the instructions of the CCP Central Committee. For example, the Western Sichuan District under the Southwest District executed 1,188 counterrevolutionaries in November 1950, 942 in December, 1,309 in January, 3,030 in February, 1,076 in March, and 844 in April 1951 since receiving the “Double Ten” instructions, while the Western Sichuan District under the Southwest District executed 844 since receiving the “Double Ten” instructions. Mao's instructions to control the killings, a total of only 403 people were killed from late April to early June. The Western Sichuan Party Committee gave clear instructions on May 4: “From May onwards, all those who have no blood debts, arson, poisoning, assassination and those who cannot pacify the anger of the masses without killing are not allowed to be approved for killing, and all prisoners who have been approved for killing will be examined in detail in the original number of approvals, and whether there are any of the above cases and how many of them there are, I hope to find out right away.” [24] (Jianxi 1/114/3~40)

Of course, merely asking localities to be cautious in executing human prisoners, suspending arrests and proposing a moratorium on the death penalty were not sufficient to solve the problem of excessive arrest and killing figures at all, except for a few places. These few places, mainly divided into two cases, one is like Shandong Province, because the past is an old area, the land reform has killed a few batches, this time to kill, the murderer is close to 0.5 per thousand of the total population, so the provincial party committee has long believed that “the number has reached a limit that can not be higher. [54] The leadership's attitude was clear, and its determination to prohibit the capture of people was also great. First, like the Shanghai Municipality, because of the industrial and commercial center, the economic production task is very heavy, coupled with the gathering of the national bourgeoisie, Shanghai Municipal Party Committee has always been skeptical of the big

arrests and big killings, so in the policy mastery of its military control will pay more attention to the proportion. According to the situation of the arrested criminals, they obviously advocate the contraction of the number of killings. Therefore, also put forward a long time ago, “kill two thousand and then depending on the situation to decide” [58] requirements, this time naturally easy to control. However, other areas were much more complicated to control.

According to the figures announced by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at the end of May, at this time, “one and a half million people were arrested nationwide, of whom half a million had been killed” . In fact, even according to the new standards, a large number of those arrested in various regions still had to be executed. Rao Shushi told the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China that of the 260,000 prisoners in custody in East China, at least 30,000 more were to be killed during the year. [58] And the Nanking Party Committee, under the full supervision of Mao Zedong at a previous stage, had already formulated a plan to kill more people, “The number of people already killed and scheduled to be killed within this year will exceed the standard of 1.5 thousandths of a person killed in an ordinary city and will amount to one thousandth of a person's population.” ② and Rao Shushi also explicitly told the Central Committee that: “large cities throughout East China to carry out anti-revolutionary work soon, the masses hate have a blood debt or other major crimes of urban bullies, big rogues, bandits, bandits are still more than not yet arrested and not yet killed Some also dare to threaten the masses with arson, murder, sabotage, and other means (eg, Wu Yunchu The factory was set on fire by the counter-revolutionaries after the big arrest, and I myself received several threatening letters with bullets attached after the big arrest).” Therefore the cessation of arrests in large and medium-sized cities in East China should also be extended. ③

On the other hand, the question of the so-called unbalanced development of the movement was subsequently raised in various places. For example, the North China Bureau reported that “the suppression of counterrevolution in all counties and districts under its jurisdiction is unbalanced; in some places the task of suppressing counterrevolution has indeed been fully accomplished, but in others there are still a few counterrevolutionaries whose crimes are so heinous that they are not enough to be killed to satisfy the people's indignation and who are still at large, or even active in

sabotage. As for villages where no counter-revolutionary work was carried out at all and where the masses were not mobilized at all, there were also some” [59] (Issue 114, July 14, 1951, p10). “In Jinghai, after the suppression of the counter-revolution, there were still sixteen villages that could not be broken through without arrests or killings. Thirty per cent of the villages in Jiexiang have not yet mobilized the masses to suppress the counter-revolution: in Boai there are still forty per cent of the villages where the crackdown on the counter-revolution has not been hard enough or very little has been done, and the counter-revolutionaries are still recalcitrant. In places like these, where there is insufficient capture and killing, the cadres and the masses will not and should not be satisfied if the masses are not continued to be mobilized and the counter-revolution severely suppressed.” [60] (Issue 114, July 14, 1951, p11) Especially in areas like the southwestern region, where, because the land reform was only introduced one after another in the first half of 1951, the killing of landlords had only just begun, and there was no possibility at all of strictly limiting the percentage of killings. Especially with regard to the contraction policy and the question of reprieve from the death penalty, confusion of thought occurred in many places. In the words of the North China Bureau, “The communication of the resolution of the Third National Public Security Conference in various places had aroused skepticism, dissatisfaction and depression among a portion of the masses as well as among the middle and lower cadres.” [59] For this reason, Mao, who has always attached great importance to the mood of the masses, could not but turn to the instructions and emphasize that “the policy of ‘suspending execution for two years’ should in no way be interpreted to mean that death is not to be carried out for those who have a debt of blood or who have committed other major crimes for which the people have demanded the death penalty. It would be wrong to do so. We must explain this clearly to the district and village cadres and the people. For those whose crimes are so heinous that the people's anger is so deep that killing is not enough to avenge them, they must be executed to avenge their anger.” [60] (Issue 114, July 14, 1951, p12)

Because of this, after the resolution of the Third National Public Security Conference and the relevant instructions of the CCP Central Committee were conveyed, the trend of mass arrests and killings only diminished to a certain extent. From the subsequent situation, the mass arrests and killings in fact continued, only that the publicity was no longer loud and clear. In East China, for example, the statistics for May 1951 were 358,000 arrests and 100,840 executions, while the statistics for October were 468,385 arrests and 139,435 executions. From this it can be seen that in the four

months following May, the East China side captured another 110,000 people and executed nearly 40,000 more.

Thereafter, at the request of the CCP Central Committee, the “Crackdown” campaign gave way to the “Three Antis” and “Five Antis” campaigns, which began at the end of 1951. However, from November 1951 to August 1952, a new round of “anti-revolt” campaigns was launched in various places, and 71,128 people were arrested and 10,727 executed in East China alone. In East China alone, 71,128 people were arrested and 10,727 executed, and the region further deployed the third phase of the “counter-insurgency” campaign, calling for the arrest of 55,000 more people and the execution of 12,279 more. Judging from the fact that the 139,435 people executed in the first phase of the “crackdown” in East China already amounted to 0.94 per 1,000 of the total population, it can be seen that the number of people executed during the three phases was destined to greatly exceed the 1 per 1,000 proportion. [61] Here, too, in Shandong Province, where there were fewer killings, the ratio of no more than 0.5 per 1,000 of the population, which the Provincial Party Committee wanted to control, was in fact exceeded at the end of the first phase of the crackdown, reaching the level of 0.52 per 1,000 of the population. [54]

In Jiangxi Province, where the Central and South Bureau had already captured and killed more people, the first phase of the crackdown executed 17,699 people, imprisoned 26,232, and managed 20,001: the second phase sentenced 7,402 to death, reprieved 532, imprisoned 5,954, managed 14,013, and sickened and committed suicide 767: the third phase executed 1,019 people, imprisoned 13,697, and managed 4,985. In total, the three phases of the crackdown executed 25,588 people, sentenced 46,425, and controlled 39,089. If we calculate on the basis of the population of Jiangxi Province, which was 16 million at that time, the ratio of executions exceeded the maximum limit of 1.5 per 1,000, and was equivalent to the level of 1.6 per 1,000. In Fujian Province, which was close to the coastal front, the ratio of executions was a record-breaking 2.4 per 1,000 people. [61]

Strictly speaking, there were more or less authorized limits to the killing and arresting of people in the “counter-revolution”. Even though the power to kill was actually decentralized to the county level before June 1951, at least formally it was still subject to the approval of the higher authorities,

and the parties concerned or the masses were not yet able to decide on the matter too arbitrarily. In rural areas, the determination of the control of another important link in the chain of command, namely, killing, shutting down and controlling, is even more seriously out of control because it is basically in the hands of the local cadres or even the masses. In many areas, although the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China stipulates that the proportion of people subject to control should not exceed three thousandths of the total population, in fact almost all areas have greatly exceeded this proportion.

In Longping Township, Wenjiang County, Sichuan Province, for example, it was reported that “216 people were controlled in the whole township, including 76 in one village. There were 13 Taoists, 25 hooligans, 13 landlords, 8 counter-revolutionary family members, 5 cleansed cadres of the Farmers ‘ Union (landlords’ agents), 5 thieves, 7 others (and individuals who had spared ducks with the landlords were also controlled).” In addition to this, the controlled persons were also organized into labor reform teams and sent to do heavy labor, such as repairing playgrounds, substitute farming, and so on. In some villages, “all the controlled people were beaten.” [24] (Jianxi 001/461/22)

The situation was even worse in rural Guizhou. According to a Xinhua News Agency correspondent in early 1953: “The wide and large volume of mass control of bad elements in the countryside of Guizhou Province has caused serious disorganization in certain areas. Most of the controlled elements have not been examined or approved by the relevant public security departments, and many of them are controlled by the masses or by the cadres of the working groups. Landlords, counter-revolutionary family members, generally the whole family size, some areas will be thieves, vagabonds, prostitutes, most of the whole family all tube up. Ziyun County, four districts of Dexing Township, two villages, a total of three hundred and ten households, residents of 1,627 people, control of twenty-three households (all the family tube) 150 people, accounting for the township's total population of 92 strong thousandths of a thousandths of a thousandths of a thousandths of a thousandths of a thousandths of a thousandths of a thousandths of a thousandths of a thousandths of a thirty-fold. Individual extremely serious, such as Guiding County, Lu Lu Township control surface actually accounted for one-half of the total population of

the township. Dushan County, the township population of eighty-three thousand six hundred and sixty-one people, a total of four hundred and fifty-six control, in December last year by the Southwest Ministry of Public Security and the Provincial Public Security Bureau check the results, only eleven people in line with the conditions of control, should not be in charge of the control of four hundred and fifty-four people. Ziyun County, a district of Songsan Township, five villages, agricultural association chairman Liang Xiuqing embezzlement of silver yuan one and a half dollars, their own words, that is, the village working group member Lu Guangmei announced the expulsion of the Farmers' Association, control. An expelled member of the Youth League in Dexing Township, District 4 of the county, was put under control for eating at the same table with a landlord in a restaurant (each paying for his own meal). A fight between two couples in Ziyun County, District 2, Village 4, peasant Banchangyuan, was declared by the working group to be under control for one year. Luo Dengyun of Pingding Village, Kichang Township, Dushan, who was seventy-eight years old, unable to move, and had no counter-revolutionary activities, was taken as the main target of control only because he had been a pseudo district chief for one year in 1926.” [47] (April 13, 1953)

How many people were “killed,” “imprisoned,” and “controlled” by the entire “Crackdown” campaign? Mao Zedong later said that 700,000 people were killed, 1.2 million were imprisoned, and 1.2 million were put under control. Mao's statement was naturally based on a report made in January 1954 by Xu Zirong, vice minister of public security. Xu reported at the time that since the anti-revolutionary campaign, the country had arrested more than 262,000, of which “more than 712,000 counter-revolutionaries were killed, more than 12,900,000 were imprisoned, and 1,200,000 were put under control, and more than 380,000 were released through education because their crimes were not serious after arrest.” (3) Taking the figure of 712,000 executed, it already amounted to one and two-fourths thousandths of one percent of the country's 500 million population at that time. This figure, which is obviously much higher than the one-thousandth of a percent level originally envisioned by Mao Zedong.

Considering that cities such as Shanghai executed only about 0.5/1000 of the total population, and that cities such as Nanjing, which were required to kill more people, executed only 1/1000 of the

total population,⁴ it can be seen that the rural areas had the largest number of executions, and in many places had already greatly exceeded the 1.5/1000 level, with some provinces and districts having exceeded the 2/1000 level. If it is noted that in late April 1951 Mao Zedong put the brakes on and politely criticized some localities for placing too much emphasis on killing too many people, to the extent that some localities were apparently under-reporting, it is likely that the actual number of executions at the national level exceeded the 712,000 figure by a wide margin. ⑤ Similarly, a comparison of the control situation in Guizhou's rural areas above shows that the statistics of the so-called number of controls being less than the number of convictions may not be very accurate either.

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